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INTRODUCTION
One Snapchat post later, and high school student S.J. was
informed that her post had cost her the chance to be a member of
her school’s cheer squad.1 Likewise, one blog post later, high school
student Avery Doninger was informed that she could no longer run
for student government.2 In yet another case, after creating a
“parody profile” of his principal on Myspace, high school student
Justin Layshock was informed that, among other punishments, he
was banned from all extracurricular activities.3 These cases and
others beg the question, should schools be allowed to bar students
from participation in extracurricular activities on the basis of
students’ online, off-campus speech?
The importance of this question is magnified by pervasive
social media use by youth. One study found that the average age
children start signing up for social media accounts is 12.6 years.4
And, for children ages thirteen to eighteen, 80% have social media
accounts.5 This number can only be expected to increase, especially
as companies such as Facebook create kid-targeted programs.6
However, despite the increasing relevance of this issue, the
United States Supreme Court has yet to provide much-needed
guidance to lower courts on how to handle cases regarding
students’ off-campus, online speech. While the Supreme Court has
ruled on a number of student-speech cases, these cases are limited
to instances where the students’ speech occurred either oncampus,7 at a school-sponsored event,8 or through schoolsponsored publications.9 Thus, the exact scope and appropriate

1. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1308–10 (D. Utah 2018).
2. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 339–42 (2d Cir. 2011).
3. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207, 210 (3d Cir.

2011) (en banc).
4. Jacqueline Howard, What’s the Average Age When Kids Get a Social Media Account?,
CNN (June 22, 2018, 10:22 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/22/health/social-mediafor-kids-parent-curve/index.html.
5. Id.
6. See Daniel Trotta, Facebook Rolls Out Messenger App for Kids Under 13, REUTERS
(Dec. 4, 2017, 10:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-messengerkids/facebook-rolls-out-messenger-app-for-kids-under-13-idUSKBN1DY28F.
7. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
8. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
9. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
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application of these Supreme Court cases remains unclear. As a
result, federal courts have floundered, reaching dramatically
different conclusions even when analyzing similar cases and
relying on the exact same legal tests.
Further, even in cases where students are participating in the
same extracurricular activity, using the same social media platform
to express their views, and expressing their views in similarly
offensive ways, courts have disagreed as to the merits of the
students’ cases.10 For example, in B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area School
District, a cheerleader was dismissed from her team for sharing a
private snap that had a curse-word-laden caption because her
school considered the post to be disrespectful to her school and
cheer squad.11 Likewise, in another recent case, Johnson v. Cache
County School District, another cheerleader was dismissed from her
team for sharing a private snap that used four-letter words because
administration thought it violated the cheer squad’s rules about
“appropriate” social media use.12 Notwithstanding the significant
similarities in these cases, the reviewing courts came to radically
different conclusions.13 In B.L., the court ruled in favor of the
student;14 in Johnson, the court ruled in favor of the school.15 The
contradictory outcomes in these two cases represent the ongoing
confusion over how schools should deal with students’ off-campus
speech on social media. More specifically, these cases illustrate the
uncertainty schools face when they choose to hold students who
participate in extracurricular activities to higher speech standards
than their peers.
Analyzing these cases, scholars and commentators have argued
for a number of different, and often contradictory, principles that
should guide courts’ decisions on student speech.16 In general,
there has been significant disagreement over whether schools
should have power to control student speech in the first place.
Some have argued that “[s]tudents are entitled to all protections

10. Compare Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1307 (D. Utah
2018), with B.L. by Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
11. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
12. 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1308–10.
13. See id. at 1324; B.L., 289 F. Supp. 3d at 616.
14. B.L., 289 F. Supp. 3d at 616.
15. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1324.
16. See sources cited infra notes 17–19.
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afforded by the Constitution, and schools do not have a right to
regulate, restrict, and/or punish their students for behavior that
would normally be constitutionally protected, no matter how
offensive or controversial the expression.”17
In contrast, some have argued that schools should have the
authority to regulate students’ online, off-campus speech but have
differed as to what legal standard courts and schools should rely
on.18 Others have declined to argue for a specific legal standard, but
have advised that if students are going to be punished under any
Supreme Court precedent, they must be afforded greater speech
protections.19
In terms of student speech specific to the extracurricular
context, the opinions have been just as wide-ranging. One
commentator has argued that certain Supreme Court precedents
should be disposed of entirely and, instead, courts should simply
recognize the already “well-established limitations on the conduct
of a student that participates in extracurricular activities.”20 In
contrast, another commentator has argued that “conditioning
participation on giving up speech rights contradicts the educational
goals of extracurricular activities and of public schools[,]” and that
schools should only be able to punish student speech if there is a
connection between the speech restriction and the “educational
goal” of the extracurricular activity.21
The problem with most of these proposed standards is that, in
practical effect, they force courts to choose between prioritizing
student speech or prioritizing the management and efficiency of
schools at a categorical level. Additionally, some of the proposed
approaches only advocate for broad Supreme Court standards that

17. Maiya Dempsey, Note, Easy to Say, Easy to See: Social Media and the Constitutional
Rights of Public School Students, 17 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 82, 84 (2018).
18. Compare Jessica K. Boyd, Note, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to Cyberspace:
How Much Protection Is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded Under the First Amendment?, 64
ALA. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2013); Brittany L. Kaspar, Note, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: Should
Schools Have the Authority to Punish Online Student Speech?, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 187 (2012).
19. See Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus
Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113, 1136 (2010).
20. Travis Miller, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 303, 330 (2011).
21. Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting Disruption, Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on
Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C. L. REV. 303, 342–43 (2012).
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are not sufficiently tailored to the unique concerns presented by
these types of student speech cases.
In response, this Note offers a new approach that provides
sufficient protection for students’ rights in the extracurricular
context, while also ensuring that schools have the necessary leeway
to regulate harmful student speech. Part I of this Note provides an
overview of Supreme Court precedent in student speech cases and
how lower courts have struggled to apply this precedent when
student speech occurs online and off-campus. Next, Part II analyzes
two common, competing approaches courts currently rely on to
analyze and resolve this legal ambiguity. This Part then discusses
why these approaches, at least applied in isolation, are inadequate
because both approaches fail to sufficiently protect students’
interests. Finally, Part III of this Note proposes what I will refer to
as the Modified Tinker Standard. This approach provides key
protections to students, while also ensuring that administrators and
coaches can effectively manage their schools’ extracurricular
programs.
I. OVERVIEW OF SPEECH RIGHTS
FOR STUDENTS IN EXTRACURRICULARS
The Supreme Court has declared that students do not “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”22 At the same time, however, the Court has
acknowledged that “the constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings.”23 Thus, in student speech cases, the Court has
sought to draw a careful balance between protecting students’
rights and protecting the efficiency and effectiveness of schools.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The first major student speech case brought before the Court
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.24 In

22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
23. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1982) (citation omitted).
24. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
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Tinker, three students wore black armbands to school to show their
disapproval of the Vietnam War.25 In response, the school district
suspended the students until they were willing to come back to
school without wearing their armbands.26
Upon review, the Court concluded that schools can punish
students for their speech, but only if the students’ speech
“materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”27 According
to the Court, this substantial disruption test was the appropriate
standard because it ensured that students’ rights to free speech
were appropriately balanced against schools’ valid need to
occasionally limit student speech.28
The Court explained, however, that this standard does not
mean that schools need to wait until a disruption has actually
occurred before taking action; but rather, “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression.”29 Based on this standard, the Court ruled
in favor of the students because they “neither interrupted school
activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of
others.”30
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
Twenty years later, the Court confronted its next student speech
case in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.31 In Fraser, high school
student Matthew Fraser delivered a student government
nomination speech that constituted an “elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor” at his school’s assembly.32 As a result,
Fraser was suspended for three days, and he was disallowed from
speaking at the school’s commencement exercises.33
When the Court reviewed the case, rather than rely on Tinker’s
substantial disruption test, it created a different standard specific to
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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Id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 353 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
See id. at 511.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 514.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1982).
Id. at 678.
Id.
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the facts of Fraser.34 Ultimately, the Court concluded, “it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use
of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”35 Thus, “[t]he
First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational
mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue . . . .”36 Therefore, the Court upheld the
school’s decision to punish Fraser for his speech.37
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Shortly after Fraser came Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.38
In Hazelwood, three students alleged that their high school principal
violated their First Amendment rights when he deleted articles that
discussed controversial topics, such as teen pregnancy, from an
issue of the school newspaper.39 The question before the Court was
whether schools had “authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”40 In answer, the
Court responded that schools have authority to refuse student
speech that might reasonably be perceived to be inconsistent with
“the shared values of a civilized social order.”41 Otherwise, schools
would be unable to adequately fulfill their key role in “awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing [the student] for later
professional training, and in helping [the student] adjust normally
to his [or her] environment.”42 Thus, the Court ruled in favor of the
school, and held, “educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 680–81.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 686.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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4. Morse v. Frederick
Finally, and most recently, in Morse v. Frederick, students at a
school-sponsored event unfurled a banner that stated, “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS.”44 To the principal, this banner promoted illegal
drug use. When one of the students refused to take down the
banner, he was suspended.45
As in Fraser, the Court in Morse affirmed the right of schools to
control student speech when students are in their school’s
custody.46 And, in Morse, although the students were not on school
campus, the banner was unfurled during normal school hours,
during a school-sanctioned trip.47 Thus, the Court concluded, “a
principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict
student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”48
B. Unclear Precedent and Conflicting Applications by Lower Courts
Notwithstanding the insights provided by Supreme Court
precedent, the exact scope and application of these cases to
students’ online, off-campus speech is debatable. Aside from Morse,
which was brought before the Court in 2007, the other student
speech cases that the Court has reviewed were decided at a time
when the technological advancements accessible to most American
students today were unimaginable. And, even if the rules
established in Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse could be easily
transplanted into the context of students’ online speech, members
of the Court have repeatedly expressed reservation about wideranging application of the rules from these cases. For example, in
his concurrence in Fraser, Justice Brennan stated, “[i]f respondent
had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he
could not have been penalized simply because government officials
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

844

Id. at 273.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
Id. at 398.
See id. at 397.
Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 403.
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considered his language to be inappropriate; the Court’s opinion
does not suggest otherwise.”49 Later, the majority in Hazelwood
appeared to validate Justice Brennan’s interpretation, stating, “[a]
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
‘basic educational mission’ even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.”50 In Morse, the Court also took
care to word its holding in such a way that narrowed its
application: “The question thus becomes whether a principal may,
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.”51
Thus, it is unclear how lower courts should apply Supreme
Court precedent, and where the rights of schools and students
stand. As Justice Thomas lamented in his concurrence in Morse, “I
am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a
right to speak in schools except when they do not—a standard
continuously developed through litigation against local schools
and their administrators.”52
Although the lower courts have tried to faithfully apply
Supreme Court precedent, they have often come to contradictory
conclusions. And, although there are cases where the facts are
distinct enough to possibly justify such conflicting holdings, “even
identical facts would likely lead to contradictory rulings given the
circuits’ analyses on this issue.”53 For example, consider the
following two cases involving online, off-campus student speech:
1. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
In Layshock, high school senior Justin Layshock used his
grandmother’s home computer to create a highly derogatory
Myspace “parody profile” of his school principal, Eric Trosch.54 For
example, Justin gave the following answers to Myspace’s “tell me
49. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
50. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
51. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring).
53. Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker in the Age
of Digital Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 918 (2012).
54. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–08 (2011).
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about yourself” section: “Birthday: too drunk to remember . . . In
the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big
dick[.]”55 Justin also claimed that Principal Trosch belonged to a
club called “Steroids International,” and he listed Principal
Trosch’s interests as “Transgender, Appreciators of Alcoholic
Beverages.”56
This profile “‘spread like wildfire’ and . . . reached most, if not
all,” of the students at Justin’s high school.57 Inspired by Justin’s
post, three other students also created parody profiles, which
ended up being even more vulgar and offensive than Justin’s.58 As
a result of these profiles, computer programming classes had to be
cancelled and, for six days, student computer use was strictly
limited to the computer labs and library, where internet use could
be closely supervised.59 Once it was discovered that Justin was
responsible for the first Myspace profile, he was given a ten-day,
out-of-school suspension, placed in an Alternative Education
Program, banned from all extracurricular activities, and not
allowed to participate in his graduation ceremony.60
When Justin’s case made it to the Third Circuit, the court began
its analysis with a discussion of the Tinker standard.61 Importantly,
the court found it meaningful that the district court could not
“establish[] a sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech and a
substantial disruption of the school environment[.]”62 Thus, the
court concluded that Tinker did not apply to Justin’s case.63
Additionally, the court concluded that Fraser did not apply.64 Citing
to Morse, the court explained, “Fraser does not allow the School
District to punish Justin for expressive conduct which occurred
outside of the school context.”65

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 208.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
See id. at 211–12.
Id. at 214 (first alteration in original) (quoting Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 219.
65. Id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007)).
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In reaching these conclusions, the court also evinced a strong
dislike for the idea that schools could monitor students’ online
speech.66 The court explained, “[i]t would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school
authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions
there to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she
participates in school sponsored activities.”67 Thus, the court ruled
in favor of Justin, and held that the school could not punish his
online, expressive conduct.68
2. Doninger v. Niehoff
In contrast, consider Doninger v. Niehoff.69 In Doninger, student
council member Avery Doninger expressed anger over the way her
school had handled an upcoming student event, Jamfest, on
livejournal.com.70 In her post, Avery referred to school
administrators as “douchebags” and encouraged students to
continue contacting Paula Schwartz, superintendent of the school
district, to complain about the alleged cancellation of the event.71
As Avery stated at the end of her post, “if you want to write
something or call her to piss her off more. im [sic] down.”72
Prior to Avery’s post, Jamfest had already been causing
problems between students and administrators.73 So, even though
administration was not aware of Avery’s post until about two
weeks later, it is unlikely that administration thought it was
unusual when, the morning after Avery’s post, they continued to
receive phone calls, emails, and personal visits regarding Jamfest.74
Additionally, a group of upset students had gathered outside the
administration’s office.75 (Critically, this group of students left as

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 216–19.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 219.
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 339–41 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 349 (“According to the undisputed facts in this case, the controversy over
Jamfest’s scheduling had already resulted in a deluge of phone calls and emails, several
disrupted schedules, and many upset students even before Doninger posted her comments
on livejournal.com.” (emphasis in original)).
74. See id. at 339–42.
75. Id. at 341.
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soon as Avery explained to them that Jamfest was not cancelled.)76
Because of these things, administrators testified that they were
forced to either miss or arrive late to “school-related activities . . .
including a health seminar, an observation of a non-tenured
teacher, and a superintendents’ meeting.”77 When administration
later discovered Avery’s post after these events had taken place,
they punished her by disallowing her from running for senior class
secretary.78
Like Justin, Avery and her parents brought suit. Although the
Second Circuit ultimately decided the Doninger case in favor of the
defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, the court concluded
that Avery’s case likely met the Tinker test, and that even Fraser was
potentially applicable to Avery’s case.79 As the court explained,
Tinker “provid[ed] ‘substantial grounds’ for the school officials here
‘to have concluded [they] had legitimate justification under the law
for acting as [they] did.’”80
To start, it was reasonable for school officials to anticipate a
substantial disruption because of the language Avery had used in
her post, and the fact that the information she had provided was
“at best misleading and at wors[t] false[.]”81 Additionally,
“Doninger’s blog post directly pertained to an event at LMHS, . . .
it invited other students to read and respond to it by contacting
school officials, [and] th[e] students did in fact post comments on
the post[.]”82 Neither was Fraser out of the question.83 Rather than
completely rule out Fraser like the Third Circuit did, the court
concluded that because “the applicability of Fraser to plainly
offensive off-campus student speech is uncertain,” so even Fraser
potentially cut against Avery’s case.84
Finally, there was already sufficient evidence that tensions were
running high about Jamfest.85 Neither party contested the fact that
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343–48.
Id. at 348 (second and third alterations in original) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 208 (2001)).
81. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2008)).
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
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“the controversy over Jamfest’s scheduling had already resulted in
a deluge of phone calls and emails, several disrupted schedules,
and many upset students even before Doninger posted her
comments on livejournal.com.”86 Thus, because tensions at the
school were already running high, the court concluded that “there
remain[ed] no triable issue here as to whether it was objectively
reasonable for school administrators to conclude that Doninger’s
posting was potentially disruptive to the degree required by
Tinker.”87
3. The irreconcilable rationales in Layshock and Doninger
The Layshock and Doninger cases showcase the extent to which
students’ rights are currently determined by jurisdictional lines.
Both Justin and Avery used online platforms to say derogatory
things about members of their school administrations, and both
Avery and Justin’s actions ended up impacting what took place oncampus. However, Avery’s post, which was arguably much less
offensive than Justin’s outrageous Myspace parody profile, was
punishable, while Justin’s post was not. Most notably, Avery’s post,
which appeared to only cause slight inconveniences for school
administrators, such as making administrators late to certain
meetings, was determined to be a substantial disruption to the
school. In contrast, Justin’s post, which arguably had a greater
impact on the student body and teachers, given the resulting class
cancellation and nearly week-long limitations on school computer
use, was not considered a substantial disruption.88
This, of course, is not to say that there are not meaningful
factual distinctions between the two cases. Unlike Avery, Justin
was not a student leader.89 And, where Avery’s punishment was
limited to the extracurricular context, Justin’s post got him

86. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 348–49.
88. Perhaps, if the school had specifically argued that Justin’s post had caused a

substantial disruption, the court may have been more willing to consider the application of
Tinker to Justin’s actions. However, even if this was the case, it is unlikely that the court
would have been willing to give too much weight to this argument, due to its aversion to
allowing schools to monitor students’ off-campus speech.
89. However, as this Note will later show, even if the facts of the cases are much more
similar (e.g., the students are both being banned from the same extracurricular activity, for
the same type of speech), courts will still come to different conclusions.
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suspended, disallowed from participating in his graduation
ceremony, banned from all extracurricular activities, etc.90 Another
difference is that in Avery’s case, tensions were already running
high, whereas at Justin’s school, his post did not occur within the
context of a problem that was already schoolwide. This is
meaningful because the higher tensions at a school are, the more a
court is justified in holding that a school administration was
reasonable in concluding that a student’s actions could cause a
substantial disruption.
These distinctions alone, however, still fail to explain the
serious differences in how the courts applied Tinker and Fraser.
According to the Third Circuit’s decision in Justin Layshock’s case,
the Tinker and Fraser tests can only be applied in specific
circumstances; in contrast, to the Second Circuit, Tinker is expansive
in its reach, and even Fraser isn’t definitively off the table. The
policy rationales motivating each court are also very different. In
Layshock, the court was incredibly sensitive to the dangers of
allowing a school’s authority to extend beyond the literal
schoolhouse gate; in contrast, the Doninger court seemed relatively
unconcerned about the possible opportunities for school overreach,
and it only mentioned the issue in passing.91 Thus, cases like
Layshock and Doninger provide more questions than answers.
C. Conflicts in the Extracurricular Context
Finally, the division amongst courts is especially highlighted in
the narrower context of regulating the off-campus, online speech of
students that choose to participate in extracurricular activities. For
90. Besides the stark fact that Justin’s punishment was clearly harsher than Avery’s
punishment, this distinction is also worth noting because a student is likely to receive greater
legal protection if his or her access to school itself has been limited. All state constitutions
mandate the creation of a public school system, and many state constitutions specifically
state that their school system will be open to all children of the state. See Emily Parker, 50State Review: Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC. COMMISSION STS. 1, 5–22
(Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligationsfor-public-education-1.pdf. In contrast, to the knowledge of the author, there are no federal
or state laws that hold that extracurricular participation is a right. Therefore, a student
automatically has much greater legal protection if her school’s punishment threatens her
right to an education, not just her desire to participate in an extracurricular activity.
91. See Doninger, 642 F.3d at 351. The Doninger court stated, “To be clear, we do not
conclude in any way that school administrators are immune from First Amendment scrutiny
when they react to student speech by limiting students’ participation in extracurricular
activities.” Id. But, the court did nothing to expand on this statement. See id.
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example, consider the details of the following conflicting
cheerleader cases.
1. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District
In B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District, a high school
cheerleader, B.L., posted a picture to Snapchat of her and her friend
“holding up their middle fingers[.]”92 Superimposed over the
picture was the caption, “fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck
everything.”93 The snap was taken in front of a local convenience
store over the weekend, and B.L. was not participating in any
school activity at the time.94 Additionally, B.L. had only sent the
snap to her private followers.95
Notwithstanding these facts, when B.L.’s snap was shown to
school authorities, B.L.’s coaches removed her from the squad.96
According to the coaches, B.L.’s dismissal was justified on the basis
that she had used profanity, and that she had violated the cheer
squad’s rules. Among other things, the rules stated,
Please have respect for your school, coaches, teachers, and other
cheerleaders and teams. Remember, you are representing your
school when at games, fundraisers, and other events. Good
sportsmanship will be enforced, this includes foul language and
inappropriate gestures . . . . There will be no toleration of any
negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or
coaches placed on the internet.97

As a result, B.L.’s parents brought suit against the school
district, seeking a preliminary injunction.98 Fortunately for B.L., the
court concluded that B.L. was likely to succeed on the merits of her
claim and granted her motion.99 First, because B.L.’s school did not
claim that her snap had caused a substantial disruption, the court
concluded, with little to no analysis, that B.L.’s punishment could
92. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 610
(M.D. Pa. 2017).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 611. Relevantly, prior to this time, B.L. had already been granted a Temporary
Restraining Order, which kept her from being removed from the team. Id.
99. See id. at 616.
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not be justified under Tinker.100 Second, B.L. could not be punished
for the offensive language in her snap because the Third Circuit had
already determined that Fraser was inapplicable to off-campus
speech.101
Further, as a policy matter, the court was very uncomfortable
with the idea of enforcing school punishments that would
essentially allow students to become the “Thought Police—
reporting every profanity uttered—for the District.”102 Therefore,
the court refused to offer a different framework for analyzing
student speech cases where the punishment involved removal from
an extracurricular activity.103 The court also concluded that if the
cheerleading rules remained in place, “B.L. would be subject to
continuing censorship of her protected speech.”104 Accordingly, the
court granted B.L.’s motion.105
2. Johnson v. Cache County School District106
Conversely, in a nearly identical case, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Utah chose to rule in favor of the school district.107 In
Johnson v. Cache County School District, shortly after finding out that
she had made her high school cheer squad, S.J. posted a video to
Snapchat of her and four other cheerleaders singing along to Big
Sean’s song, “I.D.F.W.U.”108 The snap was approximately eight
seconds long and showed the girls wearing their Mountain Crest
cheer shirts as they sang, “I don’t fuck with you, you little stupid
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 612 n.7.
See id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
See id. at 613–14.
Id. at 615.
After successfully getting a preliminary injunction, B.L.’s case was again brought
before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On March 21, 2019, the
judge issued a ruling in favor of B.L. B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376
F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2019). However, on April 12, 2019, the school district appealed. See
Brief for Appellant at 1, B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., No. 19-1842 (June 28,
2019). So, the ultimate outcome of this case is still uncertain.
106. The Author worked as a law clerk for the Litigation Division of the Utah Attorney
General’s Office that defended the Cache County School District in the Johnson lawsuit. All
information included in this Note about the Johnson case is drawn from the public record; no
confidential information has been disclosed. The opinions expressed herein are not
necessarily the opinion of the Attorney General’s Office, the Cache County School District,
or any of the individuals involved in the litigation.
107. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1324 (D. Utah 2018).
108. Id. at 1308–09.
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ass bitch, I ain’t fucking with you.”109 In addition to using similarly
offensive language to the student in B.L., S.J.’s post was also private,
and only viewable to thirty to forty of S.J.’s followers.110 Unlike B.L.,
however, around thirty minutes after posting, S.J. decided that the
snap was inappropriate to share, and she deleted it.111
Unfortunately for S.J. though, one of the recipients of her post took
a screenshot of the snap and showed school administrators and
cheer coaches.112 As a result, S.J. was dismissed from the squad.113
According to S.J.’s coaches and administrators, her punishment
was justified for several reasons.114 During the cheer tryout process,
administrators and coaches had spoken “at length” about
appropriate social media use.115 The squad’s coach had told the
students “not to post any derogatory or nasty comments, to refrain
from bullying or any ‘catty’ comments, and not to post anything
that would do dishonor to themselves, their family, or their
school.”116 Administrators had also explained that, in the past,
cheerleaders’ inappropriate social media use had escalated
problems between Mountain Crest and the neighboring high
school, Ridgeline.117 Further, upon being informed that she had
made the cheer squad, S.J. had been encouraged not to post
anything about the results until they were formally announced the
following day.118
As for the content of S.J.’s post, administration thought that the
language in S.J.’s post “bordered on threatening and was informed
that the video made other girls who had not been chosen to feel
bullied and that S.J. and the other girls were gloating.”119 In
addition to these factors, the school also concluded that S.J.’s
dismissal was appropriate because S.J. remained “unrepentant and
insistent that the post was accidental and unintentional[,]” a claim

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309–10.
See id. at 1307–10.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1308–09.
Id. at 1310.
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that led administrators to conclude that S.J. was lying to them about
her choice to post the video.120
Like B.L., S.J. brought her case to court, and asked for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.121
However, unlike B.L., S.J. was not granted either remedy.122 First,
the court concluded that it was unclear whether S.J.’s speech could
potentially be punished under Fraser because the “‘school context’
[referred to in Fraser] [could] be broader than simply ‘on school
grounds.’”123 Further, S.J.’s speech “could be viewed as more
vulgar than the offensive speech in Fraser.”124
The court also concluded that it was unlikely that S.J.’s speech
was protected under Tinker.125 Given the nature of S.J.’s speech, it
was “subject to lesser protection than the ‘nondisruptive, passive
expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker.’”126 Further, the court
concluded that the school had successfully shown that S.J.’s video
had “the effect of materially and substantially disrupting the work
and discipline of the cheer squad in a variety of ways.”127 It was
insubordinate, “ran the risk of fueling the rivalry between
Mountain Crest and Ridgeline, and had the potential of causing
conflict between students at Mountain Crest.”128
Additionally, S.J.’s punishment was also likely to be found
valid on the basis that “[t]here is a difference between excluding a
student from participation in a voluntary extracurricular activity
and disciplining or suspending a student from class.”129 Essentially,
by going out for the team, S.J. and all other students who
participated in extracurricular activities necessarily subjected
themselves to higher standards.130 As the court specifically noted,
“this court disagrees with the B.L. court’s failure to consider the
difference between a school suspension and participation in an

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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Id.
Id. at 1307.
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1317 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)).
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986)).
Id.
Id. at 1320.
Id.
Id. at 1321.
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extracurricular activity.”131 Thus, “[e]ven if S.J. had not used
profanity, she could have been disciplined for insubordination,
lying to administrators, and failing to take responsibility for her
actions.”132
Finally, unlike in B.L., where the court specifically discussed the
dangers of chilling student speech, the Johnson court did not think
that the cheer squad rules would continue to negatively impact S.J.
As the court summarized, “S.J. has no specific plan to post anything
inappropriate in the future and it is a condition of participating in
an extracurricular activity, not a condition of her right to attend
school.”133 Therefore, since the school’s actions were not a clear
violation of S.J.’s rights, the court ruled in favor of the school.134
3. The irreconcilable outcomes of B.L. and Johnson
Few factual differences exist between B.L. and Johnson. Both
students’ posts were connected to cheer and, according to their
schools, both cheerleaders showed disrespect towards their schools
and violated their squads’ rules. The only significant incongruity
between these cases is the fundamentally different interpretations
the reviewing courts and the parties to these cases had of Tinker and
Fraser, and their more general disagreement about how
extracurricular activities should be treated under the law.135
II. INSUFFICIENT CURRENT APPROACHES
FOR EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
Although it is still unclear how courts should resolve the dicey
issues presented in cases like B.L. and Johnson, trends for how
courts should evaluate these cases have begun to emerge. Most
commonly, the rationales that courts and commentators rely on
tend to diverge into one of two approaches. Under the first
approach, schools can create higher standards for students that
participate in extracurricular activities. Under the second approach,
schools can rely on courts’ generous application of the Tinker
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1323–24.
To see just how diametrically opposed the B.L. and Johnson courts are, see a later
case B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438–39 (M.D. Pa. 2019).
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standard. Unfortunately, although both of these approaches have
their merits, as I will explain below, both approaches also suffer
from serious defects.
A. Approach #1: Schools Can Create Higher Standards
for Students that Participate in Extracurricular Activities.
Some courts136 and commentators137 have concluded that one of
the best ways to resolve the debacle over students’ online speech in
the extracurricular context is to simply recognize that by going out
for the team, students necessarily subject themselves to higher
standards. This solution, which I will refer to as the Higher Standards
Approach, is attractive for a number of reasons. First, this rule cuts
down on the complexity and uncertainty courts face when students
bring claims that their rights have been violated. Rather than
struggling to apply less-than-clear Supreme Court precedent to
student speech in the digital age, courts can simply defer to a
school’s sense of judgment. Such deference is merited on the basis
that participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege, not a
right. Additionally, it is schools, not courts, that are in the best
position to determine how extracurricular programs should be run.
Second, although such outcomes would not necessarily always
be fair, the Higher Standards Approach would at least bring much
needed clarity to schools and even to students—at least in a sense.
Through this approach, schools would be able to confidently assert
boundaries for different student groups, rather than always be
uncertain as to whether their rules will embroil the school district
in a nasty lawsuit. Additionally, students would go into
extracurricular activities knowing that their school’s standards for
its extracurriculars are nonnegotiable and, if in doubt, they should
err on the side of caution when posting anything on social media.138

136. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2011); Johnson, 323
F. Supp. 3d at 1321.
137. See Miller, supra note 20, at 305.
138. Although it is possible to imagine a scenario where a court would conclude that a
school’s heightened standards for extracurricular activities had gone so far as to violate
students’ constitutional rights, as I will explain later in this Note, such outcomes will only
occur in rare, exceptional cases.
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Third, both Supreme Court139 and some circuit court140
precedents support the proposition that schools can hold students
who participate in extracurricular activities to higher standards.
For example, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, a student and
his parents challenged the school district’s policy of randomly drug
testing student athletes.141 Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of
the school.142 As the Court explained, “[b]y choosing to ‘go out for
the team,’ [students] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.”143
Additionally, the Court analogized that “[s]omewhat like adults
who choose to participate in a ‘closely regulated industry,’ students
who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to
expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy.”144 More recently, in Doninger145 and Johnson,146 the courts
have also justified their decisions, at least in part, upon this
rationale.
Notwithstanding the benefits of this Higher Standards Approach,
transplanting principles from cases like Vernonia (which did not
implicate First Amendment concerns) to cases involving student
speech on social media has a number of unwelcome consequences.
When constitutional rights are at stake, the efficiency and ease of
bright-line rules should not supplant equity and justice. Although
this approach has the benefits of being relatively straightforward
and easy to apply, it is insufficient to ensure that students’ most
important rights are protected. This is because it allows courts to
give far too much deference to schools’ decisions on student speech.
Rather than resolve more complex questions, such as whether the
student’s speech actually had a substantial impact on the school, or
rely on other, equally difficult-to-apply Supreme Court precedent,
this enables courts to take the path of least resistance and simply
conclude that the student essentially “signed up” for the speech

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
See, e.g., Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589–600 (6th Cir. 2007).
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 657.
Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989); U.S. v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
145. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2011)
146. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1321 (D. Utah 2018).
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restrictions at issue by choosing to participate in the activity. Thus,
with the exception of cases involving outrageous encroachment on
student speech, courts will likely defer to schools’ student-speech
restrictions.
Further, even though some court precedents have established
that students who participate in extracurricular activities may be
held to higher standards than normal students, there is a
meaningful difference between allowing schools to punish students
when they are on school campus, or at a school-sanctioned event,
and allowing schools to punish students for completely off-campus
speech. If a coach could not discipline players during practice, or if
club advisors were required to tolerate any and all behavior at their
events, these extracurricular programs would doubtlessly suffer.
And when parents place their children in the care and custody of a
school, the school has a duty to protect and guide them. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “When parents place minor children
in private schools for their education, the teachers and
administrators of those schools stand in loco parentis over the
children entrusted to them.”147 Likewise, it makes sense that
parents delegate some degree of authority to schools when their
children are participating in an extracurricular activity at school, or
at another location under the direct supervision of school
authorities. The same cannot be said, however, for students who
are at home using Facebook, Snapchat, Twitter, etc. As the Second
Circuit summarized, “our willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s
expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure,
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach
beyond the schoolhouse gate.”148 Thus, the facts in Vernonia, where
the relevant student activity took place on school campus, are again
distinguishable from cases where students participating in an
extracurricular activity post something online while they are offcampus.
Ambiguity and uncertainty for students is also certain to result
if schools can impose broad regulations on students’ speech
because of their involvement in extracurricular activities. In
contrast, the drug testing in Vernonia does not even come close to
147. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
148. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45

(2d Cir. 1979).
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implicating the ambiguities associated with First Amendment
concerns. Drug tests are analyzed through scientific means and
have a relatively limited range of outcomes. The same cannot be
said for student speech, which is much more subject to variables
like context, interpretation, and bias.
This is especially the case when students are communicating
online. Statements like “I ain’t fucking with you” may seem
objectively offensive to coaches and school administrators. But,
without seeing the student’s demeanor, body-language, and
understanding the context surrounding the statement, it is
impossible to tell whether a student truly intended to disrespect
coaches and undermine their team. Instead, the student may have
been merely seeking attention, or blowing off steam about an
entirely unrelated matter. Or, the student may come from a home
or neighborhood where expletives like “fuck” are everyday words
used to express a broad range of emotions; in other words, to some
students, such expletives may not be particularly weighty, or
highly offensive terms.
Even if the import of students’ online speech could always be
fairly understood by just looking at the words on the screen, it
would be far better for courts to specify that schools may only
penalize students for very specific, narrow categories of online
speech. Otherwise, schools are at liberty to penalize students for
any online speech the school perceives to be at odds with the
purpose of the extracurricular activity.
Requiring schools to have narrow, specific speech restrictions
has a host of benefits. First, such a requirement would provide
students and their parents with clearer guidelines. For example,
there is a significant difference between a school rule that students
may be dismissed for personally attacking their coach online (such
as by advocating that the coach be fired), and a school rule that
students may be dismissed for any “inappropriate” social media
use. Requiring greater specificity—or narrower speech restrictions
on students—would also prevent a school from abusing its power
and silencing student speech on the mere basis that the student’s
speech is rude, unflattering, or merely disagreed with by the school.
This would also ensure that school officials do not use broad speech
restrictions to selectively enforce vague standards against students
who have beliefs, opinions, and lifestyles that fall outside of school
859
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or community norms: the broader the speech restrictions, the easier
it is for schools to justify their choice to punish a student after-thefact.
Another reason the Higher Standards Approach is problematic is
that applying cases like Vernonia to students’ online speech gives
schools unprecedented authority to shape students’ expression
and, in turn, shape students’ thoughts and views. The core of
Vernonia is essentially a take-it-or-leave-it approach: if students
want to participate in extracurriculars, they must be willing to be
held to higher standards. If students don’t want to be held to higher
standards, they can quit the team. Before the digital age, however,
the number of ways that schools could actually hold students to
higher standards was much more limited than it is now. The school
may have been able to regulate a student’s conduct at school
dances, in class, or other similar school-sanctioned events—but
nothing nearly as personal as the private messages students send
to their friends.149
Thus, allowing schools to hold students who participate in
extracurricular activities to indeterminate “higher standards,”
while also allowing schools to monitor students’ social media
speech, will likely have a chilling effect on student speech. At the
cost of keeping their spot on the team, students may be forced to
radically change some of the most personal aspects of their life,
such as the messages they send to a single friend; or, they may be
required to forsake sharing their opinions on social media
altogether if they know that the school will punish them for
expressing any viewpoints contrary to school or community norms.
Finally, the fact that students do not have a right to
extracurricular participation does not mean that such activities are
not critical to a student’s education, or that students should be
afforded little to no protection in this area of the law. As the
Supreme Court acknowledged, “The process of educating our
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the
curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the

149. Obviously, not all social media is private. However, at the time this Note was
written, some instant message applications allow for messages to disappear unless the
recipient screenshots the message. See, e.g., Our Privacy Principles, SNAP INC.,
https://www.snap.com/en-US/privacy/privacy-center/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (“You
decide . . . just how long your Snaps stick around.”)
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shared values of a civilized social order.”150 Of the many lofty goals
of the American school system, the Supreme Court has said that
schools are “a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him adjust normally to his environment.”151
Undoubtedly, extracurricular activities provide just such
opportunities for students to learn the “values of a civilized social
order”152 and gain critical skills.
A wide variety of empirical studies have shown that there is a
meaningful link between extracurriculars and such student success.
According to National Education Longitudinal Study data, high
school participation in extracurricular activities is “positively
associated with post secondary educational attainment, voting,
volunteering, and occupational factors 2 and 8 years after high
school[.]”153 Scholars have also found that extracurricular activities
“benefited socioeconomically disadvantaged students as much or
more than advantaged students.”154 Likewise, other researchers
have concluded, “that when vulnerable youth are exposed to a
broad distribution of extracurricular activity settings . . . their
chances of being educationally resilient are enhanced.”155 It is these
disadvantaged students, who are unlikely to have access to legal
services, that will bear the brunt of extracurricular policies that
unjustly circumscribe their First Amendment rights.
If courts want to ensure that the critical benefits of
extracurriculars are truly available to students, they must not give

150.
151.
152.
153.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 493 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
The Case for High School Activities, NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS,
https://www.nfhs.org/articles/the-case-for-high-school-activities/ (last visited Dec. 23,
2019) (citing Margo Gardner et al., Adolescents’ Participation in Organized Activities and
Developmental Success 2 and 8 Years After High School: Do Sponsorship, Duration, and Intensity
Matter?, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 814, 814–30 (2008)). Notably, in the cited study,
researchers controlled for “several demographic, achievement, individual and family
factors.” Id.
154. Id. (quoting Herbert W. Marsh & Sabina Kleitman, Extracurricular School Activities:
The Good, the Bad, and the Nonlinear, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 464, 464 (2002)).
155. Id. (quoting Stephen C. Peck et al., Exploring the Roles of Extracurricular Activity
Quantity and Quality in the Educational Resilience of Vulnerable Adolescents: Variable- and PatternCentered Approaches, 64 J. SOC. ISSUES 135, 135–56 (2008)).
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schools a blank check to remove students from extracurricular
activities.156
B. Approach #2: Generous Application of the Tinker Standard
Courts have often looked to Tinker to resolve student speech
issues in the extracurricular context. Tinker is an effective catchall:
unlike cases such as Fraser and Morse, where the Court took care to
specifically limit the scope of its holdings, the language in Tinker
indicates that the substantial disruption test is susceptible to broad
application. As the Court stated in Tinker,
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.157

For this reason, even courts that are divided in their views have
relied, at least in part, on Tinker when examining students’ offcampus, online speech.158 Thus, to depart from the Tinker standard
would mean losing a helpful, intuitive rule,159 and it would also
mean taking away one of the few tests most courts agree can be
effectively applied to cases involving students’ online speech.
Unfortunately though, some courts’ application of the Tinker
standard has led to case law that is both confusing and
disingenuous to the substantial disruption test. Although Tinker
cautioned courts that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of

156. This of course does not mean that students who participate in extracurricular
activities should never be treated differently from the student body at large. There is value
in allowing schools to create heightened standards for students that participate in
extracurricular activities. Instead, this Note argues that if courts choose to give schools
unprecedented power to control students’ speech, there should be a corresponding increase
in protections given to students who choose to participate in extracurriculars.
157. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(emphasis added).
158. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. District, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1318–19 (D. Utah
2018); B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 612 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
159. I use the word intuitive because it seems only logical to conclude that matters that
could substantially disrupt a school are not limited to what takes place at the physical school.
If anything, with the immense amount of time students spend online, things said on social
media may have even greater potential to substantially disrupt a school than what actually
occurs on-campus.
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expression,”160 courts are often all too willing to defer to a school’s
interpretation of what constitutes a substantial disruption.161
Although school administrators likely understand the dynamics of
their schools better than courts ever will, even highly
knowledgeable, involved administrators are still susceptible to
overreacting or taking a student’s post personally. These realities,
combined with the natural desire to reduce conflict and maintain
order, can lead even the best-intentioned administrators to perceive
a substantial disruption where none exists.
For example, in Johnson, it was questionable at best that S.J.’s
snap would have caused a substantial disruption for the cheer
team. Based on the evidence presented to the court, it was unclear
how many members of the cheer squad, the rival school, or
students at Mountain Crest at large actually saw the post.162 And,
although S.J. used what many may consider to be inappropriate
language in her post, to say that her post could reasonably be
viewed as subversive, or that it was intended to undermine the
authority of her coaches, is taking the matter to the extreme.
S.J. ultimately deleted her snap only thirty minutes after it was
posted—a sign that she may have realized how her coaches and
school would view her actions, and that she did not want to cause
trouble. Further, even if S.J. had not deleted the post, it is only
realistic to expect that students, including those that participate in
extracurricular activities, will inevitably make mistakes and
disobey certain rules. This is especially true if such rules require
them to modify very personal aspects of their lives, such as the
pictures and videos they privately share with friends, or the
language that they typically use at home. Just because a rule has
been disobeyed does not mean that every time this happens a
substantial disruption has occurred.

160. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
161. See Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff

Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON L. REV.
247, 285 (2010); Miller, supra note 20, at 323–24.
162. Although the court importantly acknowledged that “SnapChat stories can be
saved and screen recorded by anyone in the SnapChat story and sent to others[,]” the court
could only confirm that S.J. had sent her post to approximately thirty to forty of her personal
contacts, Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1309, and that her “unknown group of ‘followers’ . . . may
have included other students who did not make the cheer squad.” Id. at 1317
(emphasis added).
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Neither should the school’s claim that S.J.’s post could have
caused a schoolwide substantial disruption satisfy the Tinker test.
First, even if merely using swear words in a vague, celebratory post
allegedly made some students feel “bullied” the fact that S.J.’s post
may have made some students feel sad about not making the
cheerleading squad is too low a threshold for a substantial
disruption. Although it may be easy to sympathize with the students
on the receiving end of this post, if the substantial disruption test
can be met any time that a single, vague statement makes a handful
of students feel offended, it is hard to imagine what would not
create a substantial disruption.
Second, it is quite a stretch to claim that S.J.’s snap would
ultimately encourage interschool conflict between Mountain Crest
and Ridgeline, and that these problems would then lead to a
substantial disruption for Mountain Crest High. Not only was S.J.’s
snap private, nothing in S.J.’s snap appeared to be directed at
Ridgeline. Additionally, even if S.J.’s snap encouraged other
cheerleaders to create similar posts, it is unclear how even this
would lead to increased rivalry, or that this rivalry would then have
a substantial impact on the school. In the defendant’s
memorandum, counsel noted that, in the past, the rivalry between
the two schools had “spawned displays of racist symbols, led to
occasional violent outbursts, and ha[d] been exacerbated by
disrespectful, cruel, and even hateful social media posts from
students from both schools.”163 But nothing in the lyrics S.J. sang in
her post was racist; and although the language in the post may have
been foul, it is unclear to whom at Ridgeline S.J.’s post could have
been interpreted as being “cruel” or “hateful.”
Unless it could be shown that the song had been consistently
used to taunt students at Ridgeline, or some other context-specific
reason why that song would be seen as an attack at Ridgeline
students, it seems odd to assume that, just because the song had
swear words, students at Ridgeline could reasonably be expected
to feel disrespected or targeted by the snap.
Therefore, a myriad of variables would have all had to perfectly
align for S.J.’s snap to truly cause a substantial disruption. And,
163. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order at 3, Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. District, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301 (2018) (No. 1:18-cv00057-DAK), 2018 WL 6831878.
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when the likelihood of a disturbance is so hypothetical, schools
should not be justified in stifling students’ speech.
Likewise, in Doninger, the school claimed that Avery
Doninger’s post had caused a substantial disruption merely
because administrators had received more phone call and emails
than on average, they had been made late to some meetings, and a
group of upset students had temporarily gathered outside the
administration’s office. While receiving more phone calls and
emails may have made for busier days for administrators, it is
doubtful that this could have caused a major disruption for the
school. When administrators are juggling the many responsibilities
of running a high school, it can only be expected that they may
occasionally be made late for meetings, or sometimes experience an
overwhelming influx of phone calls and emails. Finally, although
an upset group of students was gathered outside the
administration’s office, after Avery explained that Jamfest was not
actually cancelled, the students dispersed without further problem.
The administration did not have to lift a finger and nothing in the
case mentions that classes, or other school activities, were
negatively impacted by this event.
Although schools do not have to wait for a substantial
disruption to occur, it was unreasonable for administrators to
forecast that Avery’s post would cause further substantial
disruption. Administrators did not even know about Avery’s post
until two weeks after she had shared her thoughts. Nothing in the
Doninger case indicates that serious problems over Jamfest were
continuing by that point. Instead, the administration’s
determination that a two-week-old post would create a substantial
disruption seems questionable at best.
In sum, “Avery was still disciplined, though her online speech
did not cause actual disruption, and the possibility that it would
cause a disruption had essentially passed.”164
If the events that took place in Johnson and Doninger can be
considered substantial disruptions, even relatively mild, everyday
events can be classified as substantial disruptions. School rivalries,
even heated ones, are not uncommon. And whenever a student
chooses to defy the status quo, or question authority, there will

164.

Miller, supra note 20, at 324.
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inevitably be some level of disruption. As the Court explained in
Tinker, “any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance.”165 But disruptions of this sort are
merely the occupational hazard administrators take on when they
run a school.166
Unfortunately, until students are given greater protections,
inconveniences can constitute substantial disruptions, and highly
speculative concerns can constitute a reasonable forecast of what
will occur in the aftermath of a student’s speech.
III. A MODIFIED STANDARD TO BALANCE STUDENT
AND SCHOOL RIGHTS
A. Modified Tinker Standard
Based on the problems in the above approaches, this Note
advocates for a new legal test that will better balance the rights of
students and the needs of schools to maintain order and efficiency.
I refer to this approach as the Modified Tinker Standard. Under this
standard, three key elements must be met before a student
participating in an extracurricular activity can be penalized for
their online, off-campus speech. First, students must be put on
unambiguous notice of the specific ways in which participation in
extracurricular activities will impact their rights and
responsibilities. Second, schools must be able to show that there is
a clear connection between the unique needs of a particular
extracurricular activity and the speech restrictions associated with
the activity. Third, as an additional protection to students, there
should be a rebuttable presumption that a single, one-time
infraction of an extracurricular activity’s social media policy does
not constitute a substantial disruption.
If a school can meet the first two elements, and, if necessary,
overcome the rebuttable presumption that a single infraction of the
extracurricular’s social media policy does not constitute a

165. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
166. See id. at 508–09.
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substantial disruption, then the school would be entitled to the
benefits of the fourth and final element of the Modified Tinker
Standard. Under this final element of the Modified Tinker Standard, a
school is permitted to prove that a substantial disruption has
occurred even if the substantial disruption is limited to the
disruption of a single extracurricular activity. Put another way, this
provides a lower bar for schools to prove substantial disruption:
rather than showing that there was a schoolwide disruption, the
school would only have to prove that a single extracurricular group
had been disrupted.
As further discussion of each element of this test will show, the
Modified Tinker Standard would be effective for two key reasons.
First, it will provide protections to students that, in recent cases,
have been all but nonexistent. Second, at the same time, this
standard provides new benefits for schools and will allow schools
to remain flexible and responsive to the needs of different
extracurricular activities.
1. Unambiguous notice
Schools must be required to show that students who have
chosen to participate in an extracurricular activity have been put on
notice that their participation impacts their rights and
responsibilities. Preferably, students and parents should be given
such notice in writing, such as in a disclosure slip given to parents
and students. Additionally, coaches and club advisors should take
the time to explain the standards to parents and students.
Next, it is critical that such notice is written and explained in
such a way that will be unambiguous to students—including those
that do not necessarily share the general school community’s ideas
of what constitutes “appropriate” speech. For example, in the
Johnson case, the coaches had explained to the cheer squad that they
should not post anything that would “do dishonor to themselves,
their family, or their school.”167 In terms of the written information
students were provided about the cheer squad’s social media
policy, students were simply informed that “[m]embers w[ould] be
dismissed for improper social media usage.”168

167. Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1308.
168. Id. (first alteration in original).
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Statements such as these fail to recognize that a team is made
up of unique individuals, who may have very different views as to
what it means to “dishonor” themselves, or what it means to be
“inappropriate.”
Instead, telling students that it is not permissible to use racial
slurs, complain about their coach, or other more concrete examples,
would likely be much more effective in clarifying to students what
is and is not acceptable conduct. Such a mechanism will also ensure
that, before schools impose a speech requirement on students who
participate in extracurricular activities, administrators and coaches
will have carefully considered and defined what types of speech
will actually hurt the extracurricular program. In turn, this will
prevent schools from overreacting to students’ posts that do not
legitimately constitute a substantial disruption to an extracurricular
activity.
In addition to these benefits, requiring unambiguous notice to
students is consonant with Supreme Court precedent established in
cases where the government seeks to limit citizens’ speech: a law is
unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide an “ascertainable
standard of conduct.”169 Otherwise, citizens, and especially
students, who often will not have the resources to fight their
school’s policies and sanctions, will “steer far wider of the unlawful
zone” of the prohibited speech.170 Not only will such an incentive
to self-censor have a negative effect on students’ personal lives, it
will also prevent schools from fulfilling what the Supreme Court
has stated is one of its “vital” goals, which is to facilitate a “robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative
selection.”171
Thus, although such “disciplinary rules need not be as detailed
as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions[,]”172 schools
must be required to prove that, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the student was put on notice, in unambiguous language, of the

169. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
170. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
171. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
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ways in which their participation in an extracurricular activity
impacts their online, off-campus speech.
2. Clear connection standard
In order to penalize a student’s speech, schools must be able to
show that, objectively, there is a clear connection between the
relevant social media policy and the specific purposes of the
extracurricular activity.
Requiring a clear connection ensures that overzealous
administrators and coaches are not overreaching into students’
lives and restricting student speech when such speech restrictions
are unnecessary to the relevant extracurricular program. “Disliking
or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an
acceptable justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.”173
Likewise, a student’s participation in an extracurricular activity
should not be carte blanche for administrators and coaches to
regulate the students’ speech just to avoid “image” problems or
speech that personally makes them feel uncomfortable.
Anything less than a clear connection standard opens the door
for schools to attach greater responsibilities to extracurricular
activities simply by creating broad “educational purposes” for an
activity. For example, if all an administrator or coach has to show
is that the restriction on students’ speech is for an “educational
purpose,” or that it is “reasonably related” to the goal of the
extracurricular activity, schools will nearly always be able to show
that the social media policies that it has implemented are
“necessary.”174 Many things may relate to an extracurricular
program, but if they are not integral to the program, the value in
allowing schools to prohibit such speech is likely low—especially
when viewed in light of the chilling effect that additional social
media restrictions will have on students’ speech. Additionally,
extracurricular programs often purport to teach a variety of skills,
but that does not mean that students in every extracurricular
activity should necessarily be held to all of those educational
standards on their social media accounts. For example, although

173. Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180
(E.D. Mo. 1998).
174. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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nearly all extracurricular programs may consider one of their goals
to be teaching leadership skills, this does not mean that a school
should hold every student who participates in any extracurricular
activity to the same standards of conduct as a member of student
government.
In addition to the ways in which the clear connection standard
will protect students from sweeping speech codes, this standard is
already supported by statements the Supreme Court has made
regarding schools’ authority to regulate student speech that occurs
off-campus, during a student’s personal time. For example, in
discussing the Fraser case, the Court specifically emphasized that,
although the school was allowed to limit Fraser’s speech, which
occurred on-campus, “the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school.”175 This fact, which the Court again
reiterated in Morse,176 indicates that although “the constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings[,]”177 schools may be
required to meet a higher burden of proof when a student’s speech
occurs off-campus, during a student’s personal time. Further, the
requirement that there be a clear connection between a school’s
speech policy and the needs of an extracurricular activity also
comports with the more general First Amendment principle that if
a speech restriction is content-based, or viewpoint-based, then such
restrictions must meet some level of scrutiny.
Therefore, the clear connection standard not only ensures that
students are not forced to submit to broad speech codes in order to
participate in an extracurricular activity, it also ensures that, just
like in any other case where the government seeks to limit speech
because of its content or viewpoint, school policies are actually
scrutinized.
3. Rebuttable presumption against one-time infractions causing
substantial disruption
There should be a rebuttable presumption that a one-time
disciplinary infraction does not constitute a substantial disruption.
175. Id. at 266.
176. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406 (2007).
177. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,

340–42 (1985)).
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As has been discussed, the Tinker standard is so broad that it is
incredibly difficult for courts to decide when “school discipline
cross[es] the line from merely punishing speech that the school
disagrees with, to punishing speech that the school foresees would
cause a substantial disruption[.]”178 As a result, what constitutes a
substantial disruption in one jurisdiction will not necessarily fit the
bill in another jurisdiction. Thus, adding a presumption that tips
the scale in favor of students will provide clarity to the Tinker
analysis and, in turn, this will help improve uniformity across
jurisdictions. It will also ensure that courts are not overly
deferential to a school’s interpretation of what constitutes a
substantial disruption—something that has been a consistent
problem in past cases.
Additionally, this presumption will incentivize schools to
ensure that if they want to take extreme measures to punish
students for their speech, such as dismissing a student from a team,
they must have equally extreme facts to back up such a substantial,
impactful decision. This, of course, does not mean that a student’s
one-time post could never be enough to meet the substantial
disruption standard. If a school can show that tensions are already
running high at a school, a single, well-timed comment may be
enough to risk a substantial disruption to the school or to the
extracurricular activity itself. For example, if there have been
serious problems with racial hostilities at a school, a student’s
online comment targeting an opposing racial group could be
enough to constitute a substantial disruption. Instead, what schools
cannot do under this standard is immediately punish student
speech and then craft a creative storyline to prove that such
punishment was merited merely because if everything went for the
worse, there was a possibility that the students’ speech could have
caused a disruption.
Such a presumption will also have the additional benefit of
ensuring that schools take less extreme punitive measures when
they disagree with students’ online speech. For example, rather
than immediately dismissing a student from the team, it may be
equally effective to give the student a warning or some lesser
178. Samantha M. Levin, Note, School Districts as Weathermen: The School’s Ability to
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment from Students’ Online
Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 861 (2011).
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punishment, such as cleaning team equipment. Such measures will
still teach students that their speech has consequences, without
immediately robbing students of the critical learning opportunities
that extracurricular activities provide.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, adding this
presumption to the Tinker test will help prevent schools and courts
from “strangl[ing] the free mind at its source and teach[ing] youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.”179 The Tinker standard was intended to protect
“fundamental rights” and ensure that student expression was not
confined to “sentiments that are officially approved.”180 However,
applied in isolation, courts relying on the Tinker standard do not
consistently attain this goal. Thus, adding this presumption will
ensure that the Tinker standard will be applied as the Supreme
Court intended it to be.
4. Tinker, specifically applied to extracurriculars
Finally, if a school can prove that these three elements have
been met, then the school would be entitled to the Tinker standard
as applied to the specific extracurricular activity at issue. Although
some courts have already interpreted Tinker as having such an
application,181 other courts seem to feel compelled to show that a
student’s actions also caused a schoolwide disruption. For example,
both the Doninger and Johnson courts reviewed the ways in which a
schoolwide disruption had allegedly occurred, even though it
would have been more believable and legitimate for them to merely
prove that the extracurricular activity itself had been disrupted.182
Instead, if the three, above-described standards were met, it
would be enough for the school to show that there had been a
substantial disruption to the specific extracurricular activity. This
would allow schools to determine that there has been a substantial
disruption, even if the disruption was isolated to a relatively small
179. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (quoting W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
180. Id. at 511.
181. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 587–89 (6th Cir. 2007).
182. Likely, this stems from the fact that some of the language in Tinker indicates that
the Court intended for the substantial disruption test to only apply in the context of a
schoolwide disruption. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (referring to a substantial disruption to
“school affairs,” “school premises,” and “school activities”).
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group. For example, if a member of student government has been
cyberbullying another student, this will not likely lead to a
substantial disruption of the whole school. But, bullying is likely to
be highly disruptive to the life of the student being cyberbullied
and it is antithetical to the purpose of student government. Or, if a
member of a school’s swim team is consistently making derogatory
comments about the team coach online, this likely would not
constitute a disruption to the school, but it could reasonably be
construed to lead to serious problems for the swim team’s unity
and respect for their coach.
In addition to these benefits, allowing schools to have the
flexibility that Tinker provides is an appropriate counterbalance to
the above-described mechanisms for protecting students’ rights.
Just as students’ freedom of speech must be protected, the Supreme
Court has also repeatedly emphasized that “maintaining security
and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in
school disciplinary procedures.”183 Further, schools have a duty,
not only to facilitate students’ discussion of controversial views, but
also to teach students “the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior” and the “habits and manners of civility.”184 Therefore,
although relying on the Tinker standard still opens the door to some
level of uncertainty in judicial decision making, when combined
with the appropriate safeguards, it is still the ideal method for
dealing with such student speech cases.
CONCLUSION
Balancing students’ First Amendment rights and schools’ needs
to effectively manage their extracurricular activities is of critical
importance. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has yet to
definitively rule on the question of whether schools can condition
students’ participation in extracurricular activities on
“appropriate” social media use. As a result, lower courts have come
to radically different conclusions even when they are presented
with nearly identical fact patterns. Additionally, although
analytical frameworks for how courts should rule on these cases

183. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (citations omitted).
184. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
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have begun to emerge, neither of the two most popular frameworks
for resolving student speech cases in the extracurricular context are
sufficient. This is because, under either approach, students’ free
speech rights are nearly always subjected to the whims and
preferences of school administrators.
It is critical to ensure that students truly understand what they
are getting into when they choose to participate in extracurricular
activities, and that courts do not unduly defer to a school’s
definition of what constitutes a substantial disruption. At the same
time, utilizing a modified version of the Tinker standard provides
schools with the necessary flexibility to define key standards for
their extracurricular programs. Through implementing such
measures, a single post will not be make-or-break for a student’s
education, and school administrators and coaches can return their
full focus to what they do best: improving students’ lives through
quality education both in and out of the classroom.
Ashley Waddoups*
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